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Falling Short of the Mark: The United
States Response to the European
Union's Data Privacy Directive

Morey Elizabeth Barnes*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring and summer of 2005, the headlines of America's major
newspapers provided a constant reminder of an issue about which
Americans have grown increasingly worried: data security. Rather than
publicizing the war in Iraq or the buzz over potential Supreme Court
nominees, these headlines warned: "Info theft slams chain: 1.4 million card
numbers stolen;" 1 "Poll Says Identity Theft Concerns Rose After HighProfile Breaches;"'2 "Data Security Breaches Alarm Consumers.",3 In the
previous few months, a series of high-profile companies such as Bank of
America, Reed Elsevier Group's LexisNexis, PayMaxx, Choice Point, and
SAIC had announced that millions of records containing consumers'
personal data in their custody had been lost or stolen, putting these
individuals at risk for identity theft and similar injuries.4 Responding to
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University School of Law. Thank you to my
mother, Professor Sarah Jane Hughes of the Indiana University School of LawBloomington, for her editorial assistance with this comment.
Author's Note: This comment addresses only legislative proposals made during the first
session of the 109th Congress, and discussion is limited to a handful that could impact the
operation of the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor. This comment is not intended to analyze all
legislative proposals that would impact consumer privacy. For instance, it does not consider
transfers of passenger data, which the United States and European Union addressed in a
decision issued in October 2006. Discussion of the legislative proposals is current as of July
31, 2006.
1 Bill Husted & David Markiewicz, Info Theft Slams Chain: 1.4 Million Card Numbers
Stolen, ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 20, 2005, at IA.
2 Bob Tedeschi, Poll Says Identity Theft Concerns Rose After High-Profile Breaches,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at G5.
3 George Myers Jr. and Ken Stammen, Data-Security Breaches Alarm Consumers,
COLUMBUS (OH) DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 2005, at IA.
4 Declan McCullagh, LexisNexis Flap Draws Outcry from Congress, CNET News.com,
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rising consumer alarm, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, whose own data
had been misplaced by Bank of America, and Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania responded with The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act
of 2005 ("2005 Privacy Act"). 5 The bill proposed a series of new
requirements for corporations' handling of personal data, new penalties for
data theft, and new provisions to notify individuals whose personal data
was compromised. 6
Senator Leahy's statement that the proposed reforms were "long
overdue,"7 particularly when considered in the context of contemporary
news coverage, might have suggested that no previous legislation had
addressed data privacy in the United States. That was far from being the
case. Although the 2005 Privacy Act is Congress' most serious response to
the issue thus far,8 it is only the latest in a series of legislative attempts over
the course of the past four decades to address personal data privacy and
security.
During the past four decades, the United States has had a relatively
consistent approach to the issue, based on sector-specific legislation and
self-regulation by U.S. industries. 9 Until the late 1990s, that approach
proved satisfactory-at least for the conduct of international business. But
when the European Union introduced sweeping privacy legislation,
upsetting the international status quo on the treatment of personal data, it
became clear that the U.S. approach might create serious obstacles for U.S.
companies engaged in international transactions.
Subsequent legislative and regulatory efforts have resolved these
problems in part. In the industries that stand to suffer most from the
potential loss of international business, however-particularly the financial
services industry-those efforts have not fully solved the problem of data
privacy in the domestic and international markets.
Apr. 12, 2005, http://news.com.com/2100-7348_3-5668119.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2006).
5 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Congress (2005).
Senators Dianne Feinstein of California and Russell Feingold of Wisconsin also cosponsored the bill.
6 Declan McCullagh, Senators Propose Sweeping Data-SecurityBill, CNET News.com,

June 29, 2005, http://news.com.com/2100-7348_3-5769156.html
2006).
7 Id.
8 Id.

(last visited Sept. 23,

9 See Fred H. Cate, The ChangingFace of PrivacyProtection in the European Union and

the United States, 33 IND. L. REv. 174, 223 (1999) (noting that "the United States has
historically depended heavily on private industry, private property, and individual selfreliance"; although that "focus on individual and collective private action inevitably restrains
the power of the government to pass sweeping privacy laws ....it also facilitates
considerable privacy protection through the use of technologies, markets, industry selfregulation and competitive behavior, and individual judgment.").
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To provide a foundation for understanding the current state of data
protection requirements for international business, particularly the conflict
between the U.S. and European approaches (which dominate global
business), Part II of this comment presents a brief history of United States
and international privacy regulation, and then discusses the current
regulatory frameworks in the United States and European Union. It also
explores how U.S.-E.U. cooperation on the Safe Harbor framework has
impacted the U.S. approach to privacy regulation. Part III outlines
proposed changes to the current U.S. regulatory regime. Finally, Part IV
argues that those proposed changes fail to address the problems that
prompted renewed attention to the issue of data privacy and security. The
continuing disparity between the U.S. and E.U. regulatory regimes may
significantly impact the U.S. role as a global business leader. The United
States will have to decide whether its traditional sectoral, self-regulatory
approach can ensure the continued prosperity of its industries that depend
This comment concludes with a brief
on international transactions.
exploration of alternatives to new legislation, which might protect both
consumers and the economic interests of U.S. companies while preserving
the traditional U.S. regulatory scheme.
II. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF PRIVACY REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. History of International Privacy Legislation
Concern over the privacy and security of consumer data first arose in
the 1960s and 1970s. 10 The emergence of new information technologies in
the early 1990s introduced new possibilities for the loss and abuse of such
information. 1 These new technologies enhanced the prospects that large
national data banks would be created giving governments and corporations
carte blanche access to personal data, thus creating a new concern beyond
information in certain data banks to more invasive uses of
the accuracy of
12
personal data.
Countries began to propose legislative solutions to the carte blanche
access concern in the 1970s. The German state of Hesse promulgated the
'0

See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (noting that because "[c]onsumer reporting agencies have

assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on
consumers," Congress felt "the need to insure that [those] agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to
privacy.").
11Jeffrey B. Ritter et al., Emerging Trends in International Privacy Law, 15 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 87, 90 (Spring 2001).
12 James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor:

Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145, 148-49 (2001).
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first data privacy law in 1970; over the following decade, Sweden,
Germany, and France followed with national laws. 13 The United States was
also part of the vanguard group on government access in that decade, as
Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), the Privacy Act
of 1974 and the Freedom of Information Act. 14 (Subsequent U.S. legislative
efforts to address consumer privacy, on a sector-by-sector basis, will be
discussed later in this comment.)
In the 1980s, realizing the need for harmonization of international
privacy legislation, intergovernmental organizations began to propose
blanket guidelines that provided minimum standards for their member
nations' data privacy regulatory schemes. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") introduced Guidelines ("OECD
Guidelines") in 1980 that represented the first major international attempt to
address privacy concerns.'
Similarly, in 1985, the Council of Europe
created its Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data ("COE Convention"). Finally, in
1990 the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights
promulgated Guidelines
for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data
16
("U.N. Guidelines").
The OECD Guidelines, COE Convention, and U.N. Guidelines all
recognized the need to secure data, particularly in international transactions,
by providing a baseline level of protection.' Each document embraced a
set of "fair information principles" first announced in the OECD
Guidelines. 18 Those principles encompass eight basic tenets of consumer
privacy: collection limitation, data quality, purpose, specification, use
limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual participation, and
accountability. 19 That support of common principles theoretically facilitates
international harmonization of privacy legislation.
Each set of guidelines reflects the idea, prevalent in the European
Union Member States, that citizens have a fundamental right to privacy and
protection of their personal information. 20twMore than two doeconre
dozen countries
13Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 90-91.
14Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An
Examination of Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the United States, 29
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 109, 111 (1997).
15Julia Gladstone, The U.S. Privacy Balance and the European Privacy Directive:
Reflections on the United States Privacy Policy, 7 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL.

10, 17 (2000).
16 Id.at 18.

17Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 12, at 149.
18Gladstone, supranote 15, at 18.
19 Id.

at 17.

20Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 12, at 148 (noting that E.U. "governments recognize
data privacy as a 'political right' anchored among the panoply of fundamental human rights
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have adopted the COE Convention; many non-Member States have made
the fair information principles the basis for their own national privacy
legislation.2 '
However, all three documents are available to the
organizations' respective members on a voluntary basis only. Because their
implementation was not mandatory, and countries were given significant
discretion in implementing these guidelines, they did not lead to the
harmonization of data security regulations in the European Union and its
trading partners .22
B. The United States
In the two decades following the enactment of the FCRA, Privacy Act
of 1974 and the Freedom of Information Act, the current U.S. framework
for privacy regulation emerged. The United States employs a market-based,
self-regulatory approach to protecting consumer data, based in part on the
prevailing attitude that the privacy of personal data is an economic issue
rather than a fundamental right. The FCRA, for example, prohibits
creditors from disclosing customers' credit information to third parties
unless that information concerns a particular transaction between that
creditor and consumer, or the third party has one of certain "permissible
purposes" for gaining access to the information.23 Thus, the FCRA
emphasizes that privacy may be contingent upon the promotion of
economic activity.
The Supreme Court's evolving treatment of personal privacy has never
created an absolute right.2 Although Supreme Court case law has outlined
an "expectation of privacy" stemming from the Fourth Amendment, that
expectation is not preserved when an individual discloses data to a third
party.2 5 For instance, under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 26 enacted in
1978, customers of a financial institution "have no rights to protection from
government access 2of
personal financial information obtained from a
7
financial institution.',
Consistent with that contingent view of consumer privacy, the U.S.
and the rights attributed to 'data subjects' or citizens.").
21 Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 91-92.
22 Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 12, at 149.
21 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
24 For an extensive discussion of the Constitutional framework upon which privacy
legislation in the United States has been based, see Cate, supra note 9, at 196-209.
25 Marie Clear, Falling into the Gap: The European Union 's Data ProtectionAct and Its
Impact on U.S. Law and Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 981, 994-95

(Summer 2000) (citing U.S. v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506 (W. Va. 1999)).
26 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000).
27 Charles M. Horn, Financial Services Privacy at the Start of the 21st Century: A
ConceptualPerspective, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 89, 92 n.9 (2001).
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approach to data protection is relatively piecemeal, 28 comprising sectorspecific legislation and regulations promulgated by federal agencies
including the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), federal bank regulatory
agencies, the Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S.
Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information
Administration. Similarly, several of those same federal agencies share
responsibility for overseeing the regulatory regime along sector-specific
lines with the FTC possessing the largest number of actors in its jurisdiction
and primary authority for enforcing the Safe Harbor over a broader group of
actors. Congress has subsequently codified some of the provisions of
regulations promulgated by the individual agencies, but the resulting
framework is far from being comprehensive. For example, no federal laws
affect commercial entities who hold their own transaction data banks or
who maintain data for commercial clients as service providers to the
originators of the information and are not "consumer reporting agencies" or
"financial institutions" covered under the FCRA or the 2004 Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act amendments to the FCRA.29
Public concern, particularly about new opportunities for privacy
breaches presented by emerging technologies, led to the enactment of a
series of privacy laws in the 1980s and 1990s. Each piece of legislation
also reflected concerns about economic competition, true to the "freemarket" approach to privacy regulation still followed by the United States. 30
These laws reflect little concern that two or more industries might have
common issues with the treatment of consumer data. The first regulations
enacted by Congress primarily concerned the telecommunications industry:
the 1984 Cable Act included provisions to protect the privacy of cable
subscribers' accounts and records, in 1986 the federal wiretap statute was
revised to protect the privacy of information transmitted using emerging
electronic and digital communication forms, and the 1991 Telephone
Consumer Protection Act addressed privacy concerns "created by
autodialers and junk faxes.",3' The advent of the Internet and increased use
of electronic data storage prompted Congress to enact the FCRA, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"), and the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.32
28See, e.g., Jordan M. Blanke, "Safe Harbor" and the European Union's Directive on

DataProtection, 11 ALB. L. J. Sci. & TECH. 57, 66 (2000).
29 15 U.S.C. § 1601 etseq. (2000 & Supp. 2003).
30 See Clear, supra note 25, at 1007.
31 The European Union Data Directive and Privacy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on

Int'l Rel., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy
Information Center) available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/rotenberg-eu-testimony598.html [hereinafter Rotenberg Testimony].
32 Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 97-98; see also Cate, supra note 9, at 174.
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Prior to the 1995 introduction of the European Council Directive on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data ("Data Privacy Directive"),
which will be discussed at length in the next section, COPPA was perhaps
the most stringent privacy legislation in the international arena. Its data
provisions are similar to those of the Data Privacy Directive but apply only
to minors using the Internet.33
COPPA indicated a shift in the focus of privacy legislation in the
United States, in response to both consumer concerns and the influence of
the Data E.U.'s Data Privacy Directive. Beginning with the enactment of
COPPA, more federal laws reflected, at least in part, the "fair information
principles" and other globally accepted privacy provisions. For instance,
the Online Personal Privacy Act of 2002 ("OPPA") draws a distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive data similar to that outlined in the Data
Privacy Directive.34 Unlike other U.S. measures, the OPPA also grants a
private right of action "to American consumers who provide personal data
to U.S. companies that fall short of providing 'adequate' privacy
protection. 3 5 Similarly, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2000
includes some of the Data Privacy Directive's statutory language, including
provisions on access.36 Like the 2005 Privacy Act, however, none of
Congress' efforts in the past decade to address consumer privacy have
equaled the Data Privacy Directive's level of protection.
C. The European Union
In contrast to the United States, the European Union has a relatively
uniform and comprehensive approach to securing its citizens' personal data,
based on the principle that E.U. citizens have a fundamental right to
privacy.3 7 The cornerstone of the E.U. regulatory scheme is the Data
Privacy Directive, introduced in 1995.38 The Data Privacy Directive
evolved out of two documents, the Data Protection Act and Data Protection
Directive, both promulgated in 1995. 39 It builds on the framework of fair
information principles established by the OECD Guidelines and COE
33Kamaal Zaidi, Harmonizing US.-EU Online Privacy Laws: Toward a U.S.
Comprehensive Regime for the Protection of PersonalData, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 169,
173 (2003).
14 Id. at 188.

" Id. at 187.
36 Id. at 188.
37Assey & Elefiheriou, supra note 12, at 148 (noting that E.U. "governments recognize
data privacy as a 'political right' anchored among the panoply of fundamental human rights
and the rights attributed to 'data subjects' or citizens.").
38 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU) [hereinafter Council Directive
95/46).
39Clear, supra note 25, at 984.
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Convention in the 1980s. 40 In a significant departure from those previous
international guidelines, whose adoption by member nations was voluntary,
the Data Privacy Directive provides E.U. Member States with mandatory
baseline standards for domestic legislation protecting personal data. After
Member States
the Data Privacy Directive's formal promulgation in 1998,
41
had two years to enact legislation implementing it fully.
The Data Privacy Directive's primary objectives are to "protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, [particularly] their
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data"4 and to
facilitate the free flow of information through E.U. Member States,
furthering the economic and social integration of the European Union.43
Unlike the industry-specific approach to data privacy utilized by the United
States, the Data Privacy Directive dictates the proper treatment of data to be
based on "the nature of the data, not its use.",4 4 Preserving individuals' right
to control the use of their personal data, companies and organizations must
get consumer consent to use that data-a feature known as "opt-in"-and
45
must register in order to retain such data once they have acquired it.
In a series of thirty-four Articles, the Data Privacy Directive outlines
Member States' obligations to oversee the lawful processing of personal
data, E.U. citizens' rights of access and objection when their data is subject
to such processing, and the imposition of liability and availability of
judicial remedies in cases of improper data processing.4 6
Of greatest concern to the United States (and the European Union's
other trading partners), the Data Privacy Directive imposes significant
restrictions on the transmission of data to third countries.4 7 Article 25 of the
Data Privacy Directive prohibits the transfer of personal data to nonmember countries whose regulatory frameworks do not provide an
"adequate level of protection" (as defined elsewhere in the Data Privacy
Directive) for the privacy of domestic and/or shared consumer data.48 The
provisions of the Data Privacy Directive apply to companies based outside
the European Union,4 9 thereby preventing third parties from circumventing
the Directive (and E.U. citizens' right to the privacy of their personal data)
Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 94.
Clear, supra note 25, at 984.
42 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38.
43 Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S.MultinationalEmployers: Navigating Through
40

41

the 'Safe Harbor' Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy Directive, 38 AM. Bus.
L.J. 735, 750 (2001).
44 Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 94.
45 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38.
46

Id.

47 Id.

48

Id. art. 25.

49 Id.
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The Data Privacy Directive delegates broad responsibility for
enforcement to Data Protection Authorities ("DPAs"), officials located
within each of the E.U. Member States. 51 DPAs possess the authority to cut
off data flows from the European Union to any entity that violates the Data
Privacy Directive's provisions and to enforce any applicable national
privacy legislation, which may impose greater liability than the Directive
itself.5 Furthermore, if a U.S. company violates provisions of the Data
Privacy Directive, a DPA may notify U.S. state and federal enforcement
agencies to have those entities take additional actions against the alleged
offender.5 3 Enforcement is not limited to the DPAs; however, E.U. citizens
possess a private right of action against violators of the Data Private
Directive and corresponding Member States' privacy laws.54
D. The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor
Many U.S. companies responded with alarm-and criticism-to the
enactment of the Data Privacy Directive. Their opposition was two-fold:
they objected to its disclosure requirements, under which individuals have
the right to access all of their personal data, and insisted that implementing
all protections required by the Data Privacy Directive would have
significant economic and non-economic costs. 5 The European Union
responded by emphasizing its significant unease with the lack of centralized
enforcement authority in the U.S. regulatory scheme, which could leave
E.U. citizens "without a suitable U.S. authority to turn to if someone breaks
the rules. 56 Because most U.S. laws impacting privacy responded to
specific abuses and practices in individual industries, within one company
"the same types of personal information may be subject to different
regulatory controls., 57 The implementation of the Data Privacy Directive
and corresponding E.U. Member State legislation between 1998 and 2000
forced the United States and Europe Union to address the disparity between
their privacy regimes.
Faced with the loss of billions of dollars in annual transactions if data
flows from the European Union were restricted, U.S. companies,
represented by the U.S. Department of Commerce, entered into negotiations
with E.U. officials to create a bridge between the two regulatory schemes.
50 Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 12, at 146.
51Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38, art. 28.
52

Zaidi, supra note 33, at 172.

53Id.
54Council Directive 95/46, supra note 38.
55Clear, supra note 25, at 987.
56 Id.

57Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 96.
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The resulting "Safe Harbor" framework,58 announced in July 2000, was
intended to allow U.S. companies to fulfill the "adequate" standard of
protection mandated by the Data Privacy Directive while maintaining the
traditional U.S. approach of self-regulation.59
As former Department of Commerce official David Aaron, who led the
U.S. team of negotiators, explained, the Safe Harbor represented a
conscious choice by the United States to avoid, effectively, "apply[ing] the
E.U. Directive in the [United States]. What we were prepared to do was
issue guidance to the American business community on how to conduct
commercial relations with other countries. '60 The Safe Harbor invested the
authority to enforce its provisions in the FTC and U.S. Department of
Commerce, simultaneously addressing the European Union's unease about
decentralized enforcement and domestic industry concern about E.U.
officials exercising jurisdiction over U.S. companies. 6'
Under the Safe Harbor, participants have two options for ensuring the
adequate protection of consumer data: self-regulation and self-certification.
A company choosing the former option must join a recognized, U.S.-based
self-regulatory privacy program, such as TRUSTe or BBBOnline,6 2 that
adheres to the principles outlined in the Safe Harbor.63 One choosing the
latter option must self-certify that it follows principles consistent to those
provided in the Data Privacy Directive. 64 Under the Data Privacy Directive,
a company adopting the latter approach essentially commits itself to the
jurisdiction of the European Union if issues arise concerning its handling of
data from E.U. Member States. 65 Alternatively, self-certifying businesses
58U.S. Department of Commerce Safe Harbor, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/index
.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
59Letter from Robert S. LaRussa, Acting Under Secretary for International Trade, U.S.
Department of Commerce, to John Mogg, Director, DGXV, European Commission (July 21,
2000), available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/USLETTERFINALl.htm [hereinafter
LaRussa Letter].
60 The EU Data Protection Directive: Implicationsfor the US. Privacy Debate: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 43 (2001) [hereinafter Aaron Testimony] (statement of

Ambassador David L. Aaron).
61Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 100.
62 TRUSTe "is an independent, nonprofit enabling trust based on privacy for personal
information on the internet," which certifies and monitors its participants' privacy policies
and practices. TRUSTe-Make Privacy Your Choice, http://www.truste.org (last visited
Oct. 30, 2006). BBBOnline is a Better Business Bureau program to promote "trust and
confidence on the Internet." BBBOnLine, Inc.-Promoting Trust and Confidence on the
Internet, http://www.bbbonline.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). Participants in either privacy
program satisfy the Safe Harbor requirements for "adequate protection" and may utilize Safe
Harbor-specific despite resolution processes.
63 Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 101.
64 d.
65 Id.
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may negotiate contracts for the transfer of data with the European Union on
a case-by-case basis.66 Although that option would seem to be more in line
with the U.S. free-market approach to privacy, the costs of compliance may
be too great to make it a realistic choice for most U.S. companies. Most
multinational companies based in the United States "would have to
negotiate over thousands [of] such contracts" in order to continue normal
business transactions. 67 Faced with that possibility, U.S. companies might
decide that participation in the Safe Harbor is more efficient (and more
likely to protect their interests, should any conflicts arise).
In addition to reconciling conflicts between the U.S. and E.U.
approaches to privacy regulation, the Safe Harbor negotiations also exposed
an important weakness of the Data Privacy Directive-at least from the
perspective of innovative U.S. businesses. First introduced in 1995, before
the Internet became integral to the operation of domestic and international
business, the Data Privacy Directive to a large extent failed to take into
account emerging information technologies that changed the nature and
processes of the data being regulated.68 In contrast, as was discussed in
Section 1I.B, infra, most U.S. privacy laws enacted in the 1990s specifically
responded to such innovations. As former Department of Commerce
official Aaron explained, "the Europeans had to recognize that [they] were
trying to adopt the Directive to the most advanced information economy on
earth," which meant that "the Safe Harbor [provisions] had to be more
flexible and address real world information practices on a reasonable
basis.

69

Safe Harbor participation, which was slow to catch on in the
program's first two years, ° has grown recently. Still, it falls far short of
including a majority of the U.S. companies who would suffer severe,
adverse effects were data transfers from the European Union to be blocked.
According to the Department of Commerce Safe Harbor website, as of
October 2006, more than 1000 companies were participating in the
66Aaron Testimony, supra note 60.
67 Id.

68See id. (noting that the Data Privacy Directive "was conceived.., when there was no
World Wide Web and information technology was dominated by mainframe computers, not
distributed information networks, laptops, and digital assistants. As a result, the Directive is
often rigid or silent in dealing with privacy issues growing out of new technology and
business models. Many European States have had great difficulty translating it into domestic
law.").
69 id.

70 Only 40 companies enrolled in the Safe Harbor in its first six months; of those, only
Hewlett-Packard and Dun & Bradstreet were "large multinational" companies. The other
original participants were "generally either small to medium enterprises with privacy issues
arising from business-to-consumer transactions, or self-regulatory organizations who are in
the business of providing organizations with privacy compliance services." Assey &
Eleftheriou, supra note 12, at 147-48.
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program.7 1 Of those, more than 190 (or approximately twenty percent)
were listed as having "not current" certification status, though none had
been cited for "persistent failure to comply" with the Safe Harbor
Principles.7 2 Furthermore, the list makes it clear that not all Safe Harbor
participants use the program for comprehensive coverage of the data they
handle. Many specify which subsets of data processing they enrolled to
cover, including data processed or maintained offline, online, or manually;
or for human resources or clinical operations functions.73
U.S. officials have recently raised concern that continued lackluster
participation in the program might encourage the European Union to
reconsider whether the Safe Harbor really mirrors the letter and spirit of the
Data Privacy Directive.74 Critics of the Safe Harbor (not limited to E.U.
officials) have pointed out a number of weaknesses (or potential
weaknesses) in the program. First, the Safe Harbor does not centralize the
administration and enforcement of privacy law writ large. Second, it does
not provide a private right of action to respond to transgressions by
participating companies. That does not mean that no remedy is available
for such violations. Companies that violate the Safe Harbor are subject to
discipline by the FTC; and consumers may potentially bring class action
suits for fraud or misrepresentation against any companies that misuse
personal data.75 Despite recognition that the Safe Harbor does not preclude
alternatives,7 6 or that closing the regulatory gap between the United States
and European Union might require its revision, thus far, no parties have
demanded that the program be abandoned.
E. U.S. Privacy Legislation After the Safe Harbor
The concerns that prompted the enactment of sector-specific privacy
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as those that led to the creation
of the Safe Harbor, focused renewed legislative attention on consumer data
privacy beginning in 2000. In February of that year, for instance, several
members of Congress joined to create the Congressional Privacy
Congress. Issues highlighted in the Safe Harbor negotiations, as well as
71 U.S. Department of Commerce Safe Harbor List, http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/sh

list.nsf/webpages/safe+harbor+list (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
72

Id.

73 Id.

74 David A. Tallman, FinancialInstitutions and the Safe Harbor Agreement: Securing
Cross-BorderFinancialDataFlows, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747, 773 (Spring 2003).
75 Issues in U.S.-European Union Trade: European Privacy Legislation and BioTechnology/Food Safety Policy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations,
105th Cong. 11 (1998) (statement of Robert E. Litan, Director, Economic Studies Program,
The Brookings Institution).
76 Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 12, at 158.
77 Zaidi, supra note 33, at 189. Senators Richard Shelby of Alabama and Richard Bryan
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Congress' inability to impose stringent privacy requirements on the banking
industry, spurred the founding members of the Caucus to educate their
colleagues and advocate for additional legislation. 78 Although emphasizing
the traditional U.S. free-market approach to privacy regulation, 7 the
Caucus promoted four tenets for the handling of personal data that echoed
the internationally established "fair information principles" that:
1) individuals be informed when private firms or government
agencies collect and/or disclose personally identifiable information;
2) individuals have a right to access their personally identifiable
information and have the ability to correct it; 3) individuals must
[give] consent to a private company or government agency before it
can disclose the individual's personally identifiable information;
[and] 804) federal privacy laws do not preempt stronger state privacy
laws.
The final tenet parallels the E.U. approach to implementing the Data
Privacy Directive, in that the Directive provided a baseline standard for
E.U. Member States, who could establish higher standards in their
implementing legislation.8 1 The Congressional Privacy Caucus, similarly,
advocated that states should be permitted to enact more stringent laws to
protect the privacy and security of their citizens' personal data. 2 The
impact of the federal-state balance, however, is more likely to create
conflicting liabilities in the United States, which has twice as many states as
the European Union does members.8 3
F. Recent State Legislative Efforts to Protect Consumer Data
Several states have indeed taken the opportunity to enact data privacy
laws more stringent than those created by Congress. Some of these laws
grant citizens a general right to privacy, though courts have restricted that
84
right to torts such as intrusion and the "public disclosure of private facts."
Other state laws explicitly codify those common law privacy torts.85 Some
of Nevada and Representatives Ed Markey of Massachusetts and Joe Barton of Virginia
announced the foundation of the caucus on February 10, 2000. Fearsome Foursome Forms
Congressional
Privacy
Caucus,
PRIVACY
TIMES,
Feb.
18,
2000,
http://www.privacytimes.com/NewWebstories/caucus-priv_2_23.htm (last visited Oct. 31,

2006).
78FearsomeFoursomeForms CongressionalPrivacy Caucus, supra note 77.
79Zaidi, supra note 33, at 189.
80 FearsomeFoursome Forms CongressionalPrivacy Caucus, supra note 77.
S See discussion supra Part I.C.
82 FearsomeFoursomeForms CongressionalPrivacyCaucus, supra note 77.
83Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 31.
84 Cate, supra note 9,at 216-17.
81Id. at 217.
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states have mirrored the federal approach to privacy by enacting sectorspecific privacy legislation.8 6 Furthermore, states such as California,
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Vermont have enacted laws during the past
decade that embody the original "fair information principles" and even
include some of the central principles of the Data Privacy Directive. For
instance, Minnesota's Internet Consumer Privacy Act, enacted in 2002,
reflects fair information practices also incorporated into the Safe Harbor; 87
and Vermont's health care records law has an "opt-in" measure similar to
88
that included in the Safe Harbor Principles and the Data Privacy Directive.
Several states have enacted legislation imposing particularly stringent
regulations on the financial89services industry, for instance requiring "optin" or "opt-out" provisions.
At the time that U.S. Department of Commerce officials were
negotiating the Safe Harbor, debate began in Congress over yet another law
that would control an industry's treatment of consumer data: the GrammLeach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"). 90
GLBA amended the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 to create a new class of financial services company,
the "financial holding company," which may engage in any "financial
activity" or other activity reasonably related to financial services. 91 The
concurrent development of the Safe Harbor and GLBA created a conflict
for the U.S. financial services industry, essentially forcing its members to
choose in which regulatory framework's development they wished to
participate.92 Perhaps sensing greater potential to produce a favorable
outcome in the latter legislation, the industry was largely absent from the
Safe Harbor debates. 93 Financial services companies may have hoped that
the European Union would deem the GLBA's privacy protections, like the
Safe Harbor, to provide the adequate level of privacy protection required for
data to be transferred from E.U. Member States. Unfortunately for those
countries, GLBA has never been declared adequate under the Data Privacy
Directive.
GLBA imposed significant privacy requirements on financial services
companies.9 4 Regulations promulgated under Section 501 of the act
95
mandate "safeguards" for financial services companies' customer data.
86

id.

87 Tallman, supra note 74, at 762.
88 Zaidi, supra note 33, at 193-95.

89 Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 107-08.
90 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000).
91 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2000); see Tallman, supra note 74, at 756-57.
92 Tallman, supra note 74, at 765-65.
93 id.
94 id. at 748.

9' 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1-314.5 (2002).
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Any company subject to GLBA's provisions must implement and maintain
a security program tailored to the company's "size and complexity, the
nature and scope of [ts] activities, and the sensitivity of any customer
A company's security program must not only
information at issue.
guarantee the confidentiality and security of customer information, but also
protect against both (1) anticipated threats to that security and
confidentiality and (2) unauthorized access of customer data that could
cause "harm or inconvenience to any customer." 97 The development and
maintenance of a security program compliant with the regulations includes
designating company personnel responsible for the security and
confidentiality of customer information, identifying potential risks that
could

result

in the

"unauthorized

disclosure,

misuse ...

or

other

compromise" of customer information, and periodically evaluating and
updating the security program to address identified existing or potential
risks.98 Thus, the GLBA failed to give the financial services industry a
truly viable alternative to the Safe Harbor. 99
The enactment of GLBA and creation of the Safe Harbor encouraged
greater federal coordination to protect the privacy and security of consumer
data. Failure to comply with either set of provisions may constitute an
unfair or deceptive trade practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTC Act"), thus inviting FTC enforcement actions.' 00 FTC analysis of
whether a company is compliant with the requirements of the Safe Harbor
and other privacy laws under which the FTC has jurisdiction embodies
many of the basic principles of the Data Privacy Directive and its
international predecessors. 1 1 The FTC deems a company that adheres to
certain standards of notice, consent, access, data integrity and security, and
enforcement and redress to satisfy the Data Privacy Directive's "adequate"
protection requirement.102
The FTC's use of its enforcement powers, however, has thus far been
minimal. In November 2004, the FTC brought its first charges for noncompliance with its GLBA Safeguards and Privacy rules. 10 3 The FTC
96

Id. § 314.3.

97 Id.
98 Id.

99 Tallman, supra note 74, at 748. Despite these "Safeguards," one of the Congressional
Privacy Caucus's first actions was to voice concern that GLBA provided "inadequate"
protection to consumer privacy. FearsomeFoursomeForms CongressionalPrivacy Caucus,
supra note 77.
100 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000). Under Section 5 of the Act, which prohibits "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices," the FTC may be able to prosecute companies who fail to comply
with its own privacy policy. Tallman, supra note 74, at 762.
101Zaidi, supra note 33, at 190.
102 Id. at 190-91.
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charged two mortgage companies-Nationwide Mortgage Group, Inc., and
Sunbelt Lending Services, Inc.-with violations of the Safeguards
provisions for failure to enact "reasonable policies and procedures to ensure
the security and confidentiality of customer information," including
customers' names, social security numbers, credit histories, bank account
numbers, and income tax returns. 10 4 Both companies failed to provide
adequate privacy notices to customers. 10 5 In publicizing these charges, the
FTC was careful to clarify that the complaints only indicated that the
agency had "reason to believe" the companies had violated provisions of
GLBA, rather
than a conclusive finding that such a violation had
06
occurred.1
The Safe Harbor, GLBA, and other U.S. legislation passed subsequent
to the Data Privacy Directive reinforce the U.S. adherence to its traditional
market-based approach to privacy regulation. As two Brookings Institution
officials emphasized, "[t]he absence of generic privacy legislation in the
United States is not an indication that privacy lacks importance, but instead
reflects the fact that the Constitution and legislatures at both the federal and
state levels also value competing policy objectives." 10 7 Other supporters
have pointed out that the U.S. approach "reflects the U.S. resistance to
impose heavy burdens on business and the American preference for
commercial freedom over mandated privacy."10 8 Despite the more
ambitious scope of the Safe Harbor, those policy objectives remain the
dominant force in the U.S. approach to protecting consumer data, as is
evident in the most recently proposed legislative additions to the regulatory
framework. The next part section of this comment will discuss a few of
those legislative proposals.
III. THE 109TH CONGRESS' PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE U.S.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Spurred by requests to increase the protection of consumer data,
members of the 109th Congress introduced a handful of bills that would
alter U.S. companies' obligations to consumers-and impose penalties for
any resulting failures. Although the proposed bills have a common
impetus, and although each responds at least in part to the standard
established by the Data Privacy Directive, their foci and reach vary
Safeguards Rule

Against Mortgage Companies

(Nov.

16,

2004),

available at

http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/1 l/ns.htm.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, POLICY BRIEF No. 29,
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significantly. Generally, each of the proposed bills falls into one of three
categories. First, some bills would create new security measures that apply
to more than one industry. The 2005 Privacy Act, introduced by Senators
Specter and Leahy in June 2005, is the leading example of this type of
legislation. Second, another group of bills would amend existing legislation
(mostly applicable to the financial services and closely related industries).
This approach is embodied by the Financial Data Protection Act of 2005
("Data Protection Act"), introduced by Representative Steven La Tourette
of Ohio and Senator Tom Carper of Delaware, which would amend the
FCRA to impose data security requirements on companies handling
financial and related consumer data.10 Third, some bills address specific
transactions or practices that result in the theft of consumer data. Bills such
as the 2005 Privacy Act and Data Privacy Act have incorporated many of
the most important elements of the third type of legislation. Accordingly,
bills from the first two categories have the greatest potential to address
concerns remaining after the creation of the Safe Harbor. The following
analysis of the 109th Congress' response to the Data Privacy Directive and
shortcomings of the Safe Harbor will thus focus on the 2005 Privacy Act
and Data Protection Act. Because the impact of bills such as the Data
Protection Act would be limited primarily to the financial services industry,
analysis of legislative alternatives also will focus on that industry where
applicable.
A. The 2005 Privacy Act
The 2005 Privacy Act, clearly responding to public concern,
emphasized the threat of identity theft posed by the improper use of data.
The bill's introductory findings section highlighted the fact that that more
than nine million Americans were victims of identity theft in 2004, and
proposed that "individuals whose personal information has been
compromised or who have been victims of identity theft should receive the
necessary information and assistance to mitigate their damages and to
Perhaps
restore the integrity of their personal information and identities."
the most broad-reaching of the proposed bills, the 2005 Privacy Act
addresses three major sets of concerns related to consumer protection:
responding to the theft or improper handling of consumer data, monitoring
data collection by large companies, and increasing the accountability of the
federal government for its use of citizens' data.
First, the 2005 Privacy Act would create a specialized scheme of civil
and criminal penalties for identity theft and related "violations of data
privacy and security," and would provide resources for state and local law
109Financial Data Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data
Protection Act of 2005, S. 2169, 109th Cong. (2005).
110Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Congress (2005).
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enforcement agencies to pursue violators.11 ' The bill proposes specialized
responses to incidents of identity theft generally involving (1) fraud or
criminal activity, (2) organized crime, and (3) the concealment of violations
of consumer data security." 2 Violators would be subject to fines, jail
sentences, or both, subject to proposed changes to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines." 3 In addition to preventative measures, the bill also proposed
new methods for responding to data security breaches and identity theft. It
would create specific courses of action to be followed in the event of a
large-scale data security breach. 114 In particular, parallel to requirements of
the Data Privacy Directive, the bill includes requirements for notifying
individuals whose personal data has been lost or compromised." 5
Second, the 2005 Privacy Act would establish processes to be followed
by companies collecting and using personal data from 5000 or more
consumers. 116 The bill would subject those "data brokers" to restrictions
and regulations similar to those in effect in the European Union, with
additional measures made applicable only to the largest-scale data
handlers. 17
Finally, the 2005 Privacy Act would increase the federal government's
responsibility to handle data properly by enhancing the regulations
concerning federal government use of commercial databases."' These
provisions would apply to any federal contract with a "data broker" worth
more than $500,000. ' The bill would further require agencies intending to
enter into such contracts to conduct "privacy impact assessments" before
commencing the projects. 20 Each of the primary federal agencies would be
required to appoint a Chief Privacy Officer to ensure the agencies'
compliance with the bill's requirements. 121 Federal agencies wishing to use
individual screening programs would have to receive Congressional
authorization first.' 2 By creating provisions for the federal government as
stringent as those applicable to private actors, the 2005 Privacy Act mirrors
an important characteristic of the Data Privacy Directive, which does not
distinguish between private and public actors in its expectations for the
111 Id.
112Id.
113 McCullagh,

supra note 4.

114 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Congress (2005).
115 Id.
116 id.
117

Id.

118 McCullagh, supra note 4. The requirement would apply only to federal agency use of

a commercial database consisting "'primarily' of U.S. citizen information." Id.
119 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Congress (2005).
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proper use of personal data.
B. The Data Protection Act
Compared to the 2005 Privacy Act, the bills proposing amendments to
the FCRA are much more limited in scope, at least insofar as the industries
to which they would apply are concerned. The Data Protection Act,
introduced in the House of Representatives in October 2005 and in the
Senate two months later,1 23 would impose on credit reporting and related
financial institutions the duty to create and maintain "reasonable policies
and procedures to protect the security and confidentiality of sensitive
financial information" whose misuse might result in harm to the
consumer. 24 Like the 2005 Privacy Act, the Data Protection Act would
require companies collecting and using consumer data to investigate and
data, with an eye toward
address any leaks or other
125 mishandlings of such
theft.
identity
preventing
Two important distinctions between the Data Protection Act and 2005
Privacy Act should be noted. First, the Data Protection Act would be more
limited in scope than the 2005 Privacy Act. The Data Protection Act would
provide for its provisions to be read in concert with those of GLBA, to
ensure that the bills would not impose conflicting obligations upon financial
services organizations.126 The 2005 Privacy Act, in contrast, would apply
to companies regardless of their obligations under existing federal law.
Second, the bills approach the issue of enforcement differently. As was
discussed above, the 2005 Privacy Act would create a uniform scheme of
civil and criminal punishments for violators, with penalties varying
according to the degree of the offense committed in connection with the
misuse of consumer data. The Data Protection Act, in contrast, would
continue the traditional U.S. approach of sector-specific, decentralized
enforcement.1 27 A series of agencies under whose purview financial
institutions fall, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and
Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Exchange Commission, and the Federal
28
would retain compliance oversight.
That diversified oversight scheme, established by the FCRA, would
123 Financial Data Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data
Protection Act of 2005, S. 2169, 109th Cong. (2005).
124Id.

125 Id.
126
127

Id.
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The other federal agencies charged with oversight of the financial services

industry are the Office of Thrift Supervision and the National Credit Union Administration.
Horn, supra note 27, at 89 n.3.
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ensure that the agencies best positioned to identify issues within different
financial services organizations have responsibility for ensuring their
compliance. However, it also would leave open the possibility, which
worried the European Union, that no agency will be able to respond to more
complex issues within the industry-for instance, misuses of financial data
by a company engaged in transactions involving the domain of multiple
agencies. Furthermore, the Data Protection Act would permit a handful of
federal authorities, including the Secretary of the Treasury, to create
exemptions to the bill's security requirements.129 As such, the enforcement
scheme proposed by the Data Protection Act may fall short of satisfying the
concerns made explicit by the European Union in the Data Privacy
Directive about providing "adequate" protection to all consumers.
IV. THE 2005 PRIVACY ACT AND DATA PROTECTION ACT
WOULD FAIL TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES ABOUT THE
PROTECTION OF CONSUMER DATA
Although the legislation introduced by the 109th Congress would
increase protection for the privacy of consumer data, none of the proposed
bills would comprehensively address concerns expressed during the Safe
Harbor negotiations and in the wake of recent major data breaches. The
issues not addressed by current legislative proposals could prevent a
meaningful reconciliation of the two regulatory regimes.
A. Issues Unresolved by the 2005 Privacy Act and Data Protection Act
First, none of the proposed bills would create a private cause of action
for individuals whose data is mishandled. All enforcement authority would
continue to reside in the federal government, with some models preserving
the current division of power, which delegates responsibility to a handful of
federal agencies. Second, none of the proposed bills would provide
remedies for individuals residing outside the United States. That
shortcoming would undermine guarantees made to the European Union by
the U.S. Department of Commerce when it advanced the Safe Harbor
Principles.' 30 The bills proposed during the 109th Congress thus far would
address many serious concerns applicable only to domestic privacy, and
would create a more secure atmosphere for the use and transmission of
consumer data within the United States. However, none of them would
129Financial Data Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data
Protection Act of 2005, S. 2169, 109th Cong. (2005).
130,I would like to confirm that we agree that privacy legislation should not apply
differently on the basis of nationality, as provided for in paragraph 19(e) of the OECD
guidelines and paragraph 70 of the explanatory memorandum and to assureyou that ifsuch
legislation were proposed in Congress, we would work within the legislative process to
avoid any such effects." LaRussa Letter, supra note 59 (emphasis added).
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satisfactorily resolve the conflict with the Data Privacy Directive that
prompted the promulgation of the Safe Harbor Principles and poses a
continuing threat to the uninterrupted transaction of international business
by U.S. companies.
Third, none of the proposed bills would provide comprehensive
coverage of critical U.S. industries.
Some provisions, theoretically
applicable to all U.S. companies that collect and use consumer data, would
exclude important industries from their coverage. The 2005 Privacy Act,
for instance, effectively would make universally applicable standards to
which only financial institutions are currently subject (under the GLBA).13'
However, that bill specifically would exclude from its requirements
organizations subject to GLBA and the FCRA, as well as to HIPAA.' 3 2
This final issue reflects the evolution of business forms (a phenomenon not
limited to the United States), under which a company operating several
lines of business may be subject to the jurisdiction of more than one
government agency.
Although the United States has a tradition of sector-specific regulation,
as companies become increasingly sophisticated and organizationally
complex, the more narrowly tailored regulations proposed by the 109th
Congress might prove inadequate to address even purely domestic concerns
about the collection and transmission of consumer data. Even if the
European Union were to decide that the 2005 Privacy Act, Data Protection
Act, or another new law provided "adequate" protection for consumer data,
it would not foreclose the possibility of industry-specific obstacles. Any
bill excluding individual industries, particularly the financial services
industry or another equally dependent on constant data transfers, would
leave open the possibility of sector-specific action by the European Union,
which could impede or even obstruct entirely that industry's critical
transactions.
The potential for such interruption, and its impact on U.S companies'
ability to conduct everyday international business transactions, arose in the

Financial Data Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data
Protection Act of 2005, S. 2169, 109th Cong. (2005). For instance, the 2005 Privacy Act
131

enables individuals to address and correct issues with the accuracy of their personal
information, and requires data brokers to inform individuals when previously deleted
information is re-inserted into their personal accounts. The bill would also pre-empt state
legislation addressing consumer control. In form, pre-emption parallels the E.U. approach
that the Data Privacy Directive and other measures provide a foundation upon which
Member States may build in enacting implementing data privacy legislation. In practice, the
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1 33
late 1990s, eventually prompting the negotiation of the Safe Harbor.
Many of the companies who stand to suffer such losses have closely
connected domestic and international practices, and will be unable to avoid
conflict in the conduct of everyday businesses transactions. A determination
by the European Union that new U.S. legislation does not comply with the
spirit of the Data Privacy Directive may lead the European Union to block
the transmission of all personal data from its Member States to cease
flowing to U.S. companies. Non-compliance may entirely obstruct
everything from personal banking or brokerage transactions to U.S.
companies' ability to manage human resources functions involving their
European-based employees. 1 4 If the overarching weaknesses of any of the
proposed bills persist after the enactment of new legislation, the possibility
exists that U.S. and E.U. trade officials will have to work together again in
the manner they did to agree upon the Safe Harbor Principles promulgated
in 2000.
As Congress again considers each of the proposed bills, or perhaps in
subsequent legislation, it may eliminate some or all of these outstanding
concerns. However, as current legislation largely perpetuates the previous
self-regulatory attitude taken by the United States to the concept of data
security, and to the extent that companies have had input into proposed
legislation, none of the bills currently under consideration are guaranteed to
earn the European Union blessing of ensuring adequate privacy protection.
And even without Congressional action, no guarantee exists that the transfer
of personal data between the United States and E.U. Member States will
continue unimpeded.
Several issues merit brief mention. First, several years after its
creation, the Safe Harbor remains vulnerable to criticism. Critics of the
program have contended that it fails to satisfy the Data Privacy Directive's
"adequate protection" standard. They have alleged that the introduction of
dozens of federal and state laws concerning data privacy has critically
undermined the Safe Harbor's efficacy. 135 Second, even the European
Union's regulatory regime has its flaws. For instance, current E.U.

133 See supra Part II.D.

As the 1998 effective date of the Data Privacy Directive
approached, U.S. companies became extremely nervous about whether they would be able to
continue to conduct business in Europe. Because "no official body in either the European
Union or any individual European nation had determined U.S. law to be 'adequate,' ongoing
data transfers from Europe to the United States across a wide number of significant
industries ... were in jeopardy of being disrupted." Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 99. U.S.
companies, in an attempt to counter this perceived threat, claimed that the Data Privacy
Directive violated international trade policy by constituting a non-tariff barrier to trade,
because it would have the effect of "placing essential businesses and services of mutual
benefit to both economies at risk." Id.
134 George et al., supra note 43, at 738.
135 Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 112.
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regulations do not provide for consumer notification when major breaches
of data security do occur. Because the European Union lacks the authority
to enforce all of its regulations against private companies, response to
violations of data security is limited to private actions, and as a result may
serve as less of a deterrent than would the bills currently under
consideration in the United States.
B. Data Privacy's Impact on the U.S. Role as a Global Business Leader
It is worth noting that the continued debate over privacy regulation
reflects, and takes place in the context of, a constant competition for the
domination of global business. As the United States emerged and
maintained its status as a global economic leader, its businesses have been
used to dictating the rules and regulations with which its global counterparts
were forced to comply in order to be competitive. 136 The European Union's
regulatory scheme has _presented a serious challenge to U.S. global
commercial dominance. 13 As the European Union continues to impose the
most stringent regulations, to some extent, U.S. businesses have been
forced to adapt their practices to comply with those standards, and the
United States is ceding some of its leadership.
The European Union's enforcement of its Data Privacy Directive
against non-Member States demonstrates its increased global business
leadership. The force with which the Data Privacy Directive is being
enforced may reflect past frustration on the part of E.U. Member States with
the degree to which the United States directed other countries' domestic
policies through its own global business leadership. 138 Furthermore,
developing economies interested in competing with current commercial
superpowers have most closely followed the European Union's leadership
in setting their own regulations. Alignment with the European Union
regulatory framework may provide those countries with "an important
bridge towards increased economic opportunities with the lucrative [E.U.]
marketplace" and allow their companies to handle data originating in the
1 39
European Union without the potential for expensive disruptions.
Additionally, those countries may have been motivated
by the conflicts
140
evident in the debates over the Safe Harbor principles.
Finally, the balance of power in those developing economies may
more closely resemble that in the European Union, further recommending
136Clear, supra note 25, at 981.
137Id.

138 George et al., supra note 43, at 736.
139

Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 104-05.
at 104. For instance, in the United States there is considerable tension between the

140 Id.

public and private sectors. In countries where less of this tension exists, "the enactment of a
generic architecture for privacy law is significantly easier to accomplish." Id.
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the adoption of its regulatory framework. 41 By contrast, the influence of
the private sector in the United States has significantly complicated "the
As Marc
enactment of a generic architecture for privacy law."' 4 2
Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, pointed out, as the Data Privacy Directive motivates more and more
countries to adopt laws and regulations to protect consumer data, "[t]he
United States is becoming increasingly isolated in the global debate over
privacy protection."1 43 If that trend towards isolation continues, it may
preclude the possibility for reconciliation of the U.S. and E.U. regulatory
schemes.
C. Suggested Improvements to Current Legislative Proposals and
Alternatives to Federal Legislation
The United States and European Union need to engage in further
cooperative activity to eliminate or reduce the impact of competing
liabilities that the new regulations will impose on U.S.-based financial
services businesses. If the system is not amended, companies on both sides
of the Atlantic-and around the world-will be haunted by the persistent
possibility that the everyday conduct of international business transactions
could come to a halt. Not only will basic transactions be delayed or entirely
obstructed, but also U.S. companies will face increased difficulty in
managing the human resources and related aspects of their business that
involve European-based employees.
To respond to continuing concerns from both the United States and
European Union, Congress should make a few key amendments to the
existing legislative proposals.
First, Congress should revisit the "fair information principles"
promoted by the Congressional Privacy Caucus,' 44 particularly to consider
whether new bills should pre-empt state legislation on consumer privacy.
As this comment discusses, a handful of states have led the way in
strengthening consumer protection. 45 Following the E.U. approach,
Congress could enact new legislation that would serve as a baseline for data
security. This would leave states free, as are E.U. Member States, to pass
more stringent measures, which could have two benefits. First, setting a
federal standard would preserve the traditional U.S. market-based approach
to regulation. Second, from the European perspective, it would add a layer
of enforcement to the U.S. regulatory scheme (presuming that states were
given enforcement power, analogous to that granted to the DPAs in the
141
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M Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 31.
144 See infra at note 77.
W4See supra Part II.D; see also Ritter et al., supra note 11, at 108-09.
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European Union). These similarities to the Data Privacy Directive's
approach could help close the gap between current U.S. and E.U. regulatory
policy, without forcing the United States to abandon its traditional approach
to regulation.
Indeed, the key to resolving the conflict between the U.S. and
European frameworks-with the former's relatively narrow conception of
business operations because its regulations only concern "domestic
operations and activities"'' 46 and the latter's presumption that the majority of
data transfers in the global economy will be transborder' 47 -may lie in state
rather than federal regulations. 48 As discussed in Part II.D, supra, several
states have enacted legislation based on the "fair information principles"
embodied in the Data Privacy Directive (and other international attempts to
regulate consumer privacy). Assuming any future legislation does not
foreclose the possibility of state-level regulation,14 9 it may present the best
opportunity for closing the regulatory gap between the United States and
European Union. At the same time, it would preserve the market-based
approach traditionally utilized in the United States, while encouraging
greater protection for consumers. U.S.-based companies with customers in
multiple states would have to comply with the most stringent laws in order
to avoid domestic liability. Alternatively, they would have to segregate all
customer data according to the laws affecting it, an approach that would be
expensive and difficult to self-audit.
In addition to giving serious consideration to the question of preemption, Congress also could add to any new legislation provisions
mandating that every U.S. company engaged in international consumer data
transactions participate in Safe Harbor-approved programs. Insofar as the
European Union seems to have accepted the Safe Harbor in practice, this
would add to the guarantee that no data transactions would be interrupted
by E.U. officials. U.S. companies, however, may have a mixed response to
this type of proposal. Major industries, including financial institutions,
have repeatedly emphasized the value they place on the current U.S.
regulatory approach, and might be able to secure significant delays in
implementation for any mandatory Safe Harbor participation. On the other
hand, increased participation in self-regulatory programs might leave more
control with industries and the market-and would therefore be more true
to the traditional U.S. approach. The most accurate gauge of industry
response to either of these proposals would be to include it in the legislation
being considered by the current Congress.
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Even if the United States does not enact more stringent regulations, the
Data Privacy Directive and recent incidents concerning the loss or misuse
of data have caused U.S. industries and consumers to pay much more
attention to the issue. While states are free to enact harsher regulations, it
may be to companies' disadvantage to maintain the current regulatory
framework, where compliance and liability may be based on fifty different
sets of laws, each more stringent than federal requirements, even if those
laws do not place enforcement authority with any federal agency
comparable to one of the European Union's DPAs.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Electronic Privacy and Information Center Executive Director
Marc Rotenberg explained, the European Union's Data Privacy Directive is
not only a challenge for U.S. businesses participating in today's global
economy but also "a reminder that our privacy laws are out of date and that
there is much work to be done... to ensure the protection of [consumer
privacy]. Further action against the [Directive] will not make the privacy
concerns in the [United States] go away." 150 To an extent, U.S. legislative
and regulatory actions since the enactment of the Data Privacy Directive
have done some of that much-needed work. First, the Safe Harbor
Principles promulgated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2000 were
an important step towards unifying domestic expectations for the protection
of data privacy. Those principles affirmed the traditional U.S. selfregulatory approach to privacy regulation while attempting to ensure that
the disparity between the U.S. and E.U. approaches to such regulation
would not create insurmountable obstacles for U.S. companies engaged in
transatlantic data transfers. Second, Congress has continued to examine the
issue of data privacy, prompted largely by public demand in the wake of
several highly publicized incidents of data loss and growing concerns about
identity theft.
As a response to domestic concerns, proposed bills including the 2005
Privacy Act and Data Protection Act represent progress towards more
comprehensive protection for the privacy of U.S. consumers' personal data.
As a response to the European Union's concern about the adequacy of U.S.
privacy protection, however, they may yet fall short. First, much of the
proposed legislation, including the 2005 Privacy Act, would exclude the
financial services industry and related industries, which stand to lose the
most if data transfers from the European Union are interrupted. Second, the
proposed legislation also lacks relief for non-U.S. citizens whose data is
mishandled by U.S. companies leaving unanswered one of the European
Union's primary concerns about the U.S. regulatory framework. Third, the
150Rotenberg Testimony, supra note 31.
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Data Protection Act and other proposed amendments to existing legislation
would be industry-specific, leaving open the possibility that the European
Union could interfere with auxiliary transactions still critical to U.S.
companies' ability to conduct their everyday business.
Perhaps the best approach, therefore, is to view the legislation
proposed during the 109th Congress as the first step towards both
improving the status of data security within the United States and ensuring
that U.S. companies can continue to do business with international clients
without impediment. Were Congress able to combine the measures
proposed by the 2005 Privacy Act and as amendments to the FCRA, they
might create a bill that would address both sets of concerns. Thus far,
legislation proposed by the 109th Congress reflects the need for continued
cooperation between the United States and European Union to ensure that
companies on both sides of the Atlantic-and around the world-are able to
transact everyday business unimpeded while providing sufficient protection
to the individuals whose data they utilize.
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